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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports initial experiments with a computer program which 
embodies an abstract model of a soclocultural system. The model displays a 
form of spontaneous collapse. Central to the model is the adoption and discard 
of mutually beneficial and cumulative contracts between the component actors 
of the system. 
INTRODUCTION 
It Is apparent that archaeologists, indeed social scientists generally, 
lack effective soclocultural theory. We cannot explain in any deep, systematic 
and agreed way the longterra dynamics of soclocultural systems as we observe 
tliem.  Although a wide range of theoretical approaches has been attempted 
(Menke, 1981) the climate is more one of debate and disagreement than of 
progress. 
It is widely felt that progress in the effective deployment of formal 
methods in archaeology is being prevented, or at least made much more 
uncertain, by this lack of rigorous soclocultural theory. In spite of several 
attempts In recent years to establish some kind of mathematical or 
computational basis for theory (briefly reviewed in Doran, 1986), the 
archaeological record is still necessarily Interpreted by reference to at 
worst unreliable common sense, at best the unformalised insights of cultural 
anthropology. 
If archaeology is to become a more exact science this must change. The 
program and initial experiments which I shall describe in this paper 
Illustrate a long term approach to the development of soclocultural theory 
which emphasises (a) a particular view of socioculturel systems as distributed 
problem-solvers, and (b) the role of the computer as a tool for establishing 
the implications of soclocultural hypotheses 
THE ORIGINS OF THE MODEL 
In tlie present state of soclocultural theory it seems premature and 
perhaps even counter-productive to try to model specific soclocultural 
systems. What seems to be needed is the exploration of processes that may be 
capable of generating observed socioculturel behaviour in general. If this 
exploration proves productive, it should then be possible to look into the 
archaeological record for evidence of particular processes at work. It is a 
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trulsra that if you have some Idea of what you are looking for. It Is much 
easier to find it. 
In this paper I follow Renfrew in focussing attention on sudden 
sociocultural collapse without apparent external cause. Thus: 
"Many writers In different areas have described, quite independently, the 
archaeological evidence in their region which clearly documents the sudden 
collapse of an early state society." (Renfrew, 1979, p A81). 
and 
"The culture trajectory can be analysed In terras of continuous systemic 
change, without any necessary appeal to external factors or diffusionist 
explanations. For processual archaeologists, sudden change, discontinuous 
change, remains a problem." (Renfrew, 1978, p 203). 
Renfrew looked to catastrophe theory for insights Into the origins of 
discontinuous change, but without claiming major advance in understanding by 
so doing. In related work, Allen(1982) has argued the relevance of 
'dissipatlve structures' and multiactor system concepts to the emergence of 
modern urban structure including global and local fluctuations. The CONTRACT 
model I describe here has a number of aspects In common with Allen's work. 
The CONTRACT model is based on three main assumptions. The first is 
simply that a sociocultural system may usefully be modelled in abstract 
computational terms. The second assumption is that a sociocultural system may 
be regarded as a distributed pxoblem-solver, that is, it is solving the 
problem of how best to manipulate its environment in order to maximise its own 
'wellbeing'. The system is distributed in that there arc multiple loci of 
decision, actors, each of which has only partial knowledge, and in that the 
criterion of success, 'wellbelng', is Itself distributed over the decision 
making loci and locally defined. The third assumption Is that the knowledge 
which the problem- solver necessarily uses to solve Its problem is to be 
identified with cumulative technological knowledge cooperatively deployed. 
The model's more specific origins lie In: 
— Flannery's (1972) cybernetic 'control hierarchies', associated with 
specific 'evolutionary mechanisms' such as 'promotion' and 'linearisation', 
and (following Rappoport) the concept of 'pathologies' such as 
'hypercoherence'. 
— my own previous work (Doran 1982) on the computational modelling of 
sociocultural systems and in particular the EXCHANGE model (Doran and 
Corcoran, 1985) of which the CONTRACT model is In some respects an 
abstraction. 
THE CONTRACT MODEL 
The essentials of the CONTRACT model are as follows: 
— There is a 'spatially' distributed set of actors. Two actors may or 
may not be neighbours. 
— Two or more neighboring actors can form 'contracts' to their mutual 
quantified 'benefit'. 
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— Each contract can Itself participate in higher contracts, so that 
multiple hierarchies of contracts are possible 
— In each time unit each contract receives benefit from the higher 
contracts in which It participates, and itself yields a benefit. The sum of 
these is distributed amongst Its own participating contracts or actors. The 
benefit accumulates with the actors at the base of the contract structure. 
— In each time unit contracts may be added wherever an addition is 
possible but the probability of this happening on any particular occasion is 
low. Each actor and contract has a total workload limit and no contract nay be 
added which causes any actor's or contract's workload limit to be exceeded. 
The workload is determined by all the contracts in which the actor or contract 
directly or indirectly participates. 
— Contracts are discarded when a participating actor or contract decides 
that its return from the contract is no longer sufficient. This decision is 
made on the basis of only LOCAL information. This 'limited horizon' effect ( 
an aspect of the broader notion of cognitive economy — see Doran, 1982) Is a 
central feature of the model. When a contract is discarded, all contracts 
which it directly or Indirectly supports are necessarily also discarded. This 
is the immediate mechanism by which collapse phenomena arise. 
The basic cycle of the model is thus 
REPEAT 
add some new possible contracts; 
remove some existing contracts which are no longer locally 
acceptable 
UNTIL 
experimental trial ended 
Recall that Interest is primarily in the behaviour which such a contract 
structure can display and, in particular, in possible mechanisms of 
spontaneous collapse. The most obvious association with actual soclocultural 
systems is obtained by identifying actors with settlements and contracts with 
specific forms of technological cooperation. 
THE PROGRAM 
A program has been written in PASCAL which implements a particular 
version of the CONTRACT model. Although relatively simple, this program 
necessarily contains much detail additional to the basic structure of the 
model given above. 
In the existing program: 
— a uniform spatial array of actors Is implemented 
— two contracts are neighbouring when they have neighbouring supporting 
contracts or actors. 
— only contracts Involving exactly two participants are implemented, and 
benefit Is shared equally between the participants. The benefit derived from a 
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contract depends only upon lts level In the contract hierarchy: the higher the 
level, the greater the benefit. The benefits do NOT vary with location or 
time. 
— a contract Is deleted, along with those In which It directly or 
Indirectly participates, when the benefit which It provides Is less than the 
average provided by Its neighbours, provided that a minimum number of 
neighbouring contracts exist (currently 4) and tliat the participants of the 
contract have a relatively high workload. 
frnrv  basic cycle of the model, the program provides full and/or summary 
Information about the contracts in existence and the benefits reaching the 
individual actors. 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Initial experiments have been conducted for a range of spatial layouts, 
workload limits, new contract probability settings and time durations. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 show results obtained in a typical experimental 
trial. In this experiment a uniform 9x3 array of actors was employed, with a 
O.I chance of a contract being inserted (in each situation where a contract 
could be Inserted) on a particular cycle, and a loadlimlt for each 
actor/contract of 10. Figure 1 shows total benefit reaching the actors plotted 
against time over a period of about 25 cycles. A drop from an initial plateau 
Is followed by an erratic climb to higher and higher total benefit which is in 
turn followed by a major sustained decline. Table 1 shows the actual 'spatial' 
distribution of benefit at the benefit peak and at the following trough. 
Notice that the 'collapse' is uneven being less severe on the left than on the 
right.  During this period approximately 100 contracts were In existence at 
any one time distributed over about 6 levels. 
The experiments so far performed demonstrate the following behaviour of 
the contract structure: 
  trend upwards In the total benefit reaching the actors 
  spatial variation In the benefit reaching the actors 
  tendency to low benefit at spatial boundary 
  sudden global collapses in the contract structure and consequently in 
the total benefit to the actors 
  localised collapses Including cases where the collapse has proved 
irreversible 
  a 'domino' effect whereby a collapse in one part of the structure 
leads to successive partial collapses elsewhere. 
These phenomena emerge from the precise mechanisms by which contract 
hierarchies are built and then dismantled in the light of local factors. They 
occur even though the 'environmental' context of the actor system is constant 
in time and space. 
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DISCUSSION 
The experiments demonstrate a mechanism of sudden, discontinuous collapse 
not provoked by change external to the system but brought about entirely by 
processes within it. 
However, the experiments so far performed do not constitute a systematic 
exploration of the properties of these processes and tills kind of structure. 
For example, the effects of variation in the decision rule by which contracts 
are discarded is both central to the study and yet to be assessed. 
In general, the properties of the model cannot be predicted In any detail 
In advance of experimentation. However, if the growth of the contract 
structure Is regarded as a distributed search for the optimal contract 
structure, meaning that contract structure which yields the maximum possible 
total benefit to the actors, then the tendency of the structure to stick for a 
time in suboptimal configurations before 'backtracking' and doing better Is no 
great surprise. Indeed, what the contract adding and deleting mechanisms do is 
to provide an effective locally driven backtracking mechanism. The conditions 
under wliich tlie search procedure will converge to a stable optimum are not 
known — and, as concerns soclocultural systems, probably Irrelevant. 
Of course, there can be no proof that this model and the processes which 
It contains reflect actual soclocultural phenomena. Nevertheless, they do seem 
at least as plausible as alternative formulations and, for example, offer a 
relatively concrete interpretation of Flannery's concept of 'liypercoherence' 
as a 'patliology' which can afflict soclocultural systems: too great 
integration, so that the collapse of the part brings down much of the whole. 
The relationship of the CONTRACT model to, for example, catastrophe 
theory and to established models of settlement patterning is yet to be 
examined in any detail. When this latter connection Is made. It should 
indicate how best to relate considerations at this level of abstraction to the 
delta of the archaeological record. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The initial experiments reported in this paper indicate that variants of 
the CONTRACT model may be able to contribute to our understanding of the 
processes of soclocultural change. They also support the contention that using 
a computer to explore the consequences of soclocultural assumptions Is a 
viable way to build longterra soclocultural theory and one which complements 
direct examination of the archaeological record. 
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TIME 40: 
56 154 75 92 59 79 5 51 96 
69 108 57 97 159 186 178 117 151 
46 48 128 90 102 83 73 16 69 
TIME 45: 
19 60 40 19 14 11 11 43 41 
35 58 32 12 28 23 23 27 39 
24 29 43 21 23 16 19 26 28 
Table 1:  Benefit reaching Individual actors in 9 x 3 array before 
and after the major 'collapse' shown in figure 1. 
